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Background 
 
 
The energy industry has experienced politically imposed 
changes in recent years. A wave of M&A has occurred in the 
last decade and to study how companies position themselves to 
it can shed some light on the effects of restructure in an 
industry. 
 
Purpose The aim of this thesis is to investigate what are the 
determinants behind firms engaging in M&A transactions 
based on theories and hypotheses that attempt to explain these 
strategic decisions. 
Theoretical framework The theoretical perspective used in this study is based on the 
main theories explaining merger activity. Hypotheses proposed 
by prior research are also considered. 
 
Methodology Financial data of companies operating in the energy industry 
and that were active in any year between 1995 and 2005 is 
extracted. After that, a multinomial regression analysis is used 
to find what drives a firm to be involved in an M&A activity 
using the numbers and ratios gathered and/or calculated. 
Conclusion Our results find that some established theories help explain 
some of the merger motives. Both acquirers and targets tend to 
be firms with established positions in the market and larger 
enterprise values. In addition, firms with low expected growth 
opportunities have a stronger tendency to be active in the 
takeover market. Finally, we find that relatively high amounts 
of cash are positively related to being an acquirer. 
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1. Introduction 
This introductory chapter explains the motives of our research problem stating the purpose of it, 
based on the background in the industry. Finally, it delimitates the boundaries of the research 
and provides a brief outline of the study. 
1.1 Background 
“A well-functioning internal energy market is essential if all three of Europe’s energy 
challenges of competitiveness, sustainability and security of supply are to be met.” 
(European Commission, 2008) 
When most of the European energy markets were still monopolized in the 1990s, the European 
Union (EU) started to impose liberalizing directives on the member states (European 
Commission, Competition; Energy Overview). First opening up markets for competition, then in 
recent years pushing them to decrease their emissions and invest in renewable energy, have 
naturally come to affect the industry. A wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) among energy 
companies, have swept across Europe over the last decade. The changing scene for energy 
companies is an interesting research area and in our thesis we have chosen to focus on the M&A 
activities right when the changes were starting to be imposed, namely between 1995 and 2005.  
1.2 Problem Discussion 
Most research in the merger activity field is concerned with measuring the abnormal returns of 
stock prices around the announcement of the deal. This approach is founded on the assumption 
that the market is efficient when pricing a firm’s stock and assessing the benefits and losses of a 
strategic decision in a fast and precise manner. This type of study is well fitted for evaluating 
what deal characteristics are rewarded in the market but does not address the issue of 
determining the sources driving these decisions. Additionally, the literature on the determinants 
that drive a firm to the takeover market is not as vast as other areas. Our thesis intends to add on 
to the research for investigating the motivation for these strategic choices. For this reason, we 
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decide to study the rationales for M&A in a time period where the Energy Sector is experiencing 
changes that will modify the structure of the industry permanently. 
Jensen suggests in his 1986 seminal paper that oil companies in the 80’s which experienced a 
large increase in free cash flow, used it to undertake value destroying diversification programs in 
the form of the acquisition of unrelated businesses. Consistently with Jensen, Verde (2007), a 
European energy researcher, argues that there is a trend for European companies to opt to invest 
their additional cash flow in acquisitions as an alternative to investing them in exploration, 
generation or transmission activities. 
The disciplinary effects of debt on managers are discussed extensively in literature. Jensen 
(1986) explains how a firm with large interest payments would be clearly less likely to carry out 
value destroying acquisitions. We intend to test these hypotheses in rationales for merger activity 
in the energy industry. 
A much often cited motive for M&A is to interpret them as a source for cost cutting via cost 
synergies. This leads to believe that a firm would always be keen on finding opportunities to 
increase its asset base capacity and decreasing costs per unit produced. The theory behind this 
motive is economies of scale. Mahoney and McCormick (1988) in a study of the US industry 
find evidence to suggest that merger is partially motivated by cost considerations. Jensen (1983) 
also finds cost synergies as benefits coming from takeovers and therefore a driver for this type of 
activity. 
If excess capacity is a motive for M&A activity we would expect to find firms working close to 
capacity to stay away from undertaking acquisitions. Andrade et al (2004) in an across industry 
US based study support this hypothesis. These researchers find evidence to state that excess 
capacity is a strong determinant for consolidation in an industry via mergers. 
The specific asset acquisition hypothesis is a wide explanatory motivation for merger activity 
across industries. Therefore, the desired valuable asset will vary and will be dependent on 
specific industry characteristics. McLaughlin and Mehran (1995) in a study that measures 
abnormal return on stock prices from merger announcement effects, find that the positive effect 
of stock in regulated target utilities is much smaller compared to cases where utilities operate in 
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countries classified as unregulated environments. They interpret this as an indication that 
regulation restrains merger activity. 
Transferring poorly managed or organizationally weak resources to more successful performing 
firms has been found to be a strong driver for M&A activity in the literature. The perspective that 
sees the market for corporate control as an effective method to discipline manager is thoroughly 
discussed by Jensen and Ruback (1983). These researchers propose that this effect on the 
takeover market allows resources to be transferred to more efficiently run corporations. 
To our knowledge no study has investigated the rationales behind merger activity in the 
European energy sector. For that reason we want to test these hypotheses and evidence that has 
been found significant when driving consolidation in other industries to this sector. We expect to 
find among others, that higher amounts of cash drive acquisitions, that firms operating in 
regulated countries are not as engaged in M&A activity and that excess capacity is determining 
the consolidation in the European market. 
1.3 Purpose 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate what are the determinants behind firms engaging in M&A 
transactions based on theories and hypotheses that attempt to explain these strategic decisions. 
Research of this kind has been done across industries and industry specific; this study intends to 
test whether the established theory applies for the European energy industry. 
1.4 Delimitations 
The study is concerned about the determinants of M&A within the energy industry. Therefore, in 
our definition of the European energy market we include all companies active between the years 
1995 and 2005 in the sector classifications Electricity, Oil & Gas Producers or Gas, water & 
Multiutilities, according to Thomson Financial Datastream categorization. The time frame we 
consider gives space for the effect of the restructuring of the industry given the political and 
economic changes. We do not take into account “alternative energy” since the sector, though 
high growth in recent years yet has an insignificant share of the electricity production (Eurostat, 
2008). Sub-contractors and service companies to our three sector classifications are also not 
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regarded in this thesis. This said, there might be companies in our sample having divisions or 
subsidiaries in these disregarded sectors but we stick to Datastream categorization and let the 
main business set the classification.  
The European energy market is in this thesis geographically all EU members plus Switzerland 
and Norway, totalling 29 countries. EU+2 or European Union plus Norway and Switzerland is an 
acknowledged classification, given that these countries are well integrated in the European 
Commission policies. Additionally, the energy interconnections of these countries with the EU 
cannot be disregarded (ERGEG Monitoring report, 2007). We will come back to the sample and 
data recovery in the method chapter.  
1.5 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 provides a description of the energy industry in Europe with a focus on the 
deregulation process and other specific characteristics that have been proposed as drivers for 
merger activity in the field. It also describes some specific examples of merger events in the 
industry. 
Chapter 3 is designed to provide the reader with the theoretical background of the motives for 
M&A activity. It also describes several of the hypotheses behind the rationales for merger 
activity while discussing which of them are applicable for the sector in focus and generates the 
hypotheses used in the study.  
In chapter 4, the methodology and data collection used in this thesis is described. The chapter 
discusses our research approach and research method as well as motivates our choice for the 
regression analysis used in the study. We conclude this chapter by describing the reliability and 
validity of our research. 
The empirical findings of the study are provided in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the analysis and 
interpretations of the outcome are discussed and compared to prior research. 
Finally, in chapter 6 the conclusions of our research are given as well as the proposed further 
research that can be aimed at in the field. 
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2. The Energy Industry 
This chapter will give a brief description of the industry structure followed by a section about the 
evolvement and the current regulatory environment on the European energy market. 
Characteristics of some merger events will be discussed at the end of this chapter. 
2.1 Industry Structure 
The European energy industry has taken several steps towards the goal of one internal energy 
market for electricity and gas, initiated by the European Commission in the early 1990s. Much of 
the focus is on gas and electricity, when the European energy market is discussed, but some of 
the energy sources have uses besides electricity generation (Hiro & Amaya, 2003). For instance 
both gas and oil have uses such as heating houses and as fuels for vehicles (Hiro & Amaya, 
2003).  
The energy industry can be divided into upstream, transport and downstream activities, where 
upstream represents areas such as production, wholesale and exploration (European Commission, 
Case GDF / Centrica / SPE, 2004). Downstream involves supplying and retailing (European 
Commission, Case GDF / Centrica / SPE, 2004). Numerous companies in this sector are not only 
active in the production and/or retailing but also control the utilities transporting the good. 
Transportation of for example gas and electricity are usually characterized by limitations in the 
interconnection between countries and even between regions within a country (Möllgaard & 
Kastberg Nielsen, 2004). The European Commission stresses in their report from 2008 the 
importance of infrastructure investments and states that electricity and gas markets within the EU 
are to be regarded as national due to the congestion phenomena in the grids (European 
Commission, 2008).  
The energy production and consumption pattern do differ widely between countries in the EU. 
Statistics from 2007 of the total electricity production in the EU-27 plus Norway, gives us an 
overview. 
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                      Source: Eurostat 2008 
                      Exhibit 1: Electricity Production for 2007 in the EU and Norway 
Conventional thermal accounts for 56,9% of the production, nuclear 27,7% and hydro and others 
for 15,4% (Eurostat, 2008). The rather high dependency on fossil fuels is a cause of concern 
since oil and gas production is declining in the region with increasing imports as a result (The 
European Oil and Gas Industry Market Assessment, 2005). Imports from countries with different 
political systems, than EU countries, raise the risk of disruption of the energy supply (The 
European Oil and Gas Industry Market Assessment, 2005). Gas, oil, coal and other such primary 
fuels’ security of supply is a prioritized area for the EU Commission (Newbery, 2002).  
The product markets have different characteristics. Gas plants tend to be flexible in production 
output while nuclear is not. Oil is easier and cheaper to store than gas, since gas needs to be 
liquidized in order to store (Hiro & Amaya, 2003). There is a price linkage between oil and gas 
and since the EU electricity system is increasingly being dependent on gas, oil price fluctuations 
affect the electricity price (European Commission, 2008). Hidroelectric resources can control 
their generation, and are thereby regarded as storable (Knittel & Roberts, 2005). The product 
electricity is special in the sense that it cannot be stored and that the demand is inelastic, at least 
in the short run (Knittel & Roberts, 2005). Therefore small changes in the supply can have large 
consequences for the price (Knittel & Roberts, 2005).  
Conventional 
thermal
57%
Nuclear
28%
Hydro and 
others
15%
Electricity Production EU + Norway 
2007
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To better match different market’s deficits and surpluses, wholesales for electricity came into the 
European market, with Nord Pool for the Nordic countries, German-based EEX and Paris-based 
Powernext among others. The trend has generally been an increasing number of energy 
exchanges after being just one, London's International Petroleum Exchange, for some time in the 
1990s (Wilcox, 2000). This trend seems to have taken a new pattern in 2008, where a wave of 
mergers and cross-border consolidation has occurred (Energy Risk, European energy outlook). 
European Power Exchange was the result of Powernext and EEX merging their spot and futures 
operations (Energy Risk, European energy outlook) and Nord Pool sold a division to 
NasdaqOMX. Europe’s largest gas exchange was also created in 2008, after APX Group 
acquired Endex (Energy Risk, European energy outlook). The mergers can perhaps lead to 
increased liquidity in the market places and to make the European energy market more 
homogenized (Energy Risk, European energy outlook).  
2.2 Liberalization of the European Energy Market 
The previous section described wholesale markets for energy coming to play and how they 
continue to evolve. This would not have been possible if the energy market would not have taken 
liberalizing steps and freeing up the typically state-owned, vertically integrated public utilities 
for gas and electricity (Newbery, 2002).  The European Commission has been a mean to 
deregulate the European energy market, where it has focused on gas and electricity, mostly the 
downstream and transport activities. Several steps have been accomplished but as of year 2009 
fourteen countries still have regulated prices for gas and electricity (European Commission, 
2009). Three have just regulated electricity prices and one country has only regulated gas prices 
(European Commission, 2009).  
But downstream energy activities have taken major steps; one such is that from the 1 July 2007 
all consumers in the EU can choose their energy supplier (European Commission, 2008). All 
national retail markets are thereby open for competition. A condition for this competition to be 
effective is that suppliers have access to the transmission system (Newbery, 2002). Regarding 
the transport activities, many countries still have more to do. According to Newbury (2002), the 
best solution for competitive markets is to separate the ownership of transmission and 
Page | 8  
 
generation. The number of countries with ownership unbundling of electricity operators was at 
the end of 2008 fifteen (European Commission, 2009). The same figure for gas network 
operators was twelve (European Commission, 2009). Unbundled Transmission System Operators 
(TSOs) have strong positive effect on the investments in interconnectivity capacity, compared to 
vertically integrated TSOs (European Commission, 2008). For the interconnectivity some 
progress has happened over the last decade, besides new interconnections. A compensation 
agreement, for Transmission System Operators between countries, is one important step to 
enable interconnectivity in the electricity market. In 2007 all but six countries, of the EU-27 + 
Norway and Switzerland, participated to be compared with only ten in 2002 (ERGEG 
Monitoring Report, 2007). As already mentioned in section 2.1, congestion on the 
interconnections of both gas and electricity are limiting competition. The European Commission 
do still regard the energy markets as national and one problem is the lack of transparency of each 
TSO’s network availability, where most electricity operators choose not to disclose all 
information (ERGEG Monitoring report, 2007).  
Arguably liberalizing, but the EU member states have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol and 
taking that further the member states have “agreed to a 20% reduction in CO2 emissions by 
2020” (Capgemeni, 2008). One way to push for efficiency measures in the CO2 emitting 
installations was the implementation of CO2 emission rights in January, 2005, following an EU 
directive from 2003 (Mansanet-Bataller et al, 2008). The objective with the allowances was also 
to establish a market price for emissions (Mansanet-Bataller et al, 2008). The implementation of 
CO2 emission rights has not yet come to fully affect emitting industries, such as energy, since 
the rights have to a large degree been handed out for free by the EU members’ governments 
(Capgemeni, 2008). The second commitment period started in 2008 and the next is to start in 
2013 (Mansanet-Bataller et al, 2008). When the third round starts, costs of “tens of billion of 
euros” can be expected for the energy companies, as now 100% of the emission rights will be 
auctioned to the power sector (Capgemeni, 2008). Apart from reductions in total emissions, the 
2013 “Climate Package” is expected to boost renewable energy’s share of total energy supply, 
since allowances costs is expected to be passed onto the electricity prices (Capgemeni, 2008).    
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2.3 Merger Events in the Industry 
The companies in the energy industry have reacted to the ongoing liberalization of the European 
energy market. The unbundling of previously integrated activities, CO2 emissions rights and 
other measures changing the competition can be part of the explanation of the increased M&A 
activity in recent years. Swedish Vattenfall just motivated its purchase of Dutch Nuon, to be able 
to get a critical size to handle needed investments (i.e. R&D) in coming years (Press release, 
2009-02-23). Economies of scale is a driving force in the recent years merger wave (Verde, 
2008). Though markets are still to a large extent regarded as national, multiple geographic 
presences, seems to be a way to prepare for the consequences of a completely liberalized market. 
Verde (2008) calls the trend “cross-border mergers”. Despite a cross-border merger with no 
horizontal overlaps it may bring competition limitations. One example shows on the complexity 
of this energy market in change. The joint acquisition of Spanish Hidrocantabrico, indirect by 
French EdF and Portuguese EDP. The Spanish market was isolated and in need of new 
interconnections, which the exporters EdF and EDP had the incentive to invest in. The 
Commission noticed that, after acquiring Hidrocantabrico, the incentive to invest in 
interconnections would decrease as EdF and EDP could profit directly on the relatively high 
energy prices on the isolated Spanish electricity market (European Commission, Case EnBW / 
EDP / Cajastur / Hidrocantabrico, 2002). The deal was finally accepted by the Commission but 
with some undertakings on EdF regarding further investments in interconnections (European 
Commission, Case EnBW / EDP / Cajastur / Hidrocantabrico, 2002). 
A second trend analyzed is the creation of “national champions”, which are the result of 
increasing protectionism in the energy sector (Verde, 2008). The French government intervened 
when Suez was a prospect target and created such a national champion uniting state owned GDF 
with Suez. Some remedies followed the merger, due to the dominant position it created in some 
smaller markets (European Commission, Case Gaz de France / Suez, 2006). Another example is 
Spain, which actually violating EC law when it stopped Spanish Endesa from merging with 
foreign suitors (European Commission, “Competition; Energy Overview”). The political 
dimension is obvious but the reasons may be two folded, both securing the vital energy 
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infrastructure and paving the wave for national companies in the world of globalization (Verde, 
2008).  
A third trend, intensified after 2003, is the vertical mergers, where electric generators are 
securing the supply by merging with the energy source, often gas (Verde, 2008). This trend 
repeats the pattern observed in the USA in the 1990s, after implemented deregulations of gas and 
electricity (Bergstrom & Callender 1996).  
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3. Theoretical Background 
This chapter presents the theory in which M&A shareholder value creation is founded. Firstly, 
we describe the theoretical motives for M&A by a review of the literature in the subject. 
Additionally, we discuss which of these determinants are relevant for the energy industry. 
3.1 Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions 
An extensive body of research has been made to study the effects of M&A activity on 
shareholder value. A great part of this research is composed of event studies which focus on the 
stock price movements around the announcement of activity in an attempt to assess and 
anticipate shareholder value creation. On the other hand, some researchers have been concerned 
with the rationales driving these strategic actions. Studies made in this area have found that 
certain firm- and industry-level characteristics are able to explain to a certain degree the 
consolidation within an industry.  
3.1.1 Economies of Scale 
Economies of Scale is a much cited motive for M&A activity among bidding managers and 
therefore a well known reason for mergers in all industries. Jensen (1983) by making an 
overview of the scientific evidence mentions synergies as one of the gains coming from 
takeovers. Gaughan (2002) points out that merger planners tend to cite cost-reducing operating 
synergies such as economies of scale as the main source of operating synergies. Following the 
assumption that a larger firm would be able to realize more benefits through economies of scale, 
one can hypothesize that smaller firms would be more likely to engage in M&A activity as a 
mean to enjoy lower costs. Mahoney and McCormick (1988) found, in a study in the US, that the 
cost savings from consolidating resources depended on the degree of similarity of the merged 
processes and product lines. In the same study they conclude that “the more lines of business a 
merger brings together, matching product associations found in existing firms and facilities, the 
greater the probability that merger is motivated by cost considerations”( Mahoney and 
McCormick 1988). 
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3.1.2 Excess Capacity 
Excess Capacity is generally regarded as an industry level characteristic that drives merger 
activity. Firms facing gaps in their production capacity will reduce asset efficiency and therefore 
decrease their return on invested capital. In general, the argument for M&A activity is that firms 
with excess capacity are more likely to look for ways to consolidate resources in an attempt to 
solve the issue. Danzon et al (2007) in a study similar to ours test several variables to model the 
probability that a firm will engage in M&A activity or not, based on pre merger characteristics. 
Their study is conducted on the Pharmaceutical and Biotech industries, where they find that large 
firms that expect to have excess capacity are more likely to merge in response to it. They argue 
that gaps in production of profitable products drive mergers in a similar way to how technology 
and regulatory shocks create consolidation in other industries (Danzon et al 2004). This is 
consistent with a study made on M&A during 1970 to 1994 by Andrade et al (2004) who argue 
that consolidation through mergers is a response to excess capacity in both the decades of the 
1970’s and 1980’s. Based on the variables sales growth, capacity utilization and industry 
concentration the study finds that mergers are efficient to rationalize resources. As the reader 
may note, excess capacity and economies of scale are interrelated. A merger motivated by excess 
capacity should also be analyzed by management as a likely source of economies of scale. 
3.1.3 Specific Asset Acquisition 
Specific Asset Acquisiton refers to the probability that a firm will engage in merger activity given 
that its expansion is driven by a determined already established objective. Such objectives will 
vary due to particular industry characteristics; for instance a specific valuable asset might be a 
company already established in a foreign country or a firm that decides to merge with another 
one based on regulatory reasons. The latter example is important in the energy sector and is 
brought up by McLaughlin and Mehran (1995) in an event study on M&A activity in the US 
utility industry. They argue that in the case of utilities, firms are more likely to acquire a 
competitor that is already established in a certain market instead of increasing capacity internally 
given the lengthy process of getting concession to construct a power plant or gaining regulatory 
approval. In their study McLaughlin and Mehran (1995) find evidence that regulated target 
utilities are less likely to be acquired and the announcement effect is much smaller than the 
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unregulated cases suggesting that regulation constrains M&A activity. Verde (2008) in his paper 
on the energy industry and EU merger policy suggests, after analyzing the energy liberalization 
process in the US, that in Europe the liberalization is creating integrated pan-European players 
which would benefit from a single market while minimizing the risks of becoming a target. 
3.1.4 Financing / Agency Issues 
Financing / Agency Issues. Historically, a large percentage of acquisitions are financed by cash. 
Even though, this trend has decreased in the last decades, the financing for most M&A still 
includes partial cash. Jensen (1986) proposes based on the theory of free cash flow that managers 
with large cash flows are more likely to undertake value destroying mergers. The rationale 
behind this theory is that managers with low expected growth and few investment opportunities 
will tend to use the cash flow in unprofitable projects. Consistent with this theory, Verde (2008) 
suggests that the extra cash that European energy companies have accumulated is used in M&A 
to detriment of longer-term investments such as generation, transmission or exploration 
activities. Verde (2008) hypothesizes that this trend is a result of the “short-terminism” 
investment decisions, favoring a lowest-risk and lowest-uncertainty strategy. Interestingly and 
unlike what the theory of free cash flow would predict, Danzon et al (2007) find in their study on 
pharmaceutical firms a low correlation between cash and M&A activity; even proposing that 
firms with high levels of cash flow do not tend to engage in M&A at all. 
In terms of leverage, Jensen (1986) also suggests that firms with unused debt capacity will be 
more likely to engage in M&A activity than those which are highly leveraged compared to their 
industry peers. The reason is that debt imposes certain degree of discipline on managers. Those 
who have to make interest payments would be more careful when accepting projects with low or 
negative net present values. Andrade and Stafford (2004), mentioned earlier, find evidence 
suggesting that acquirers tend to have unused borrowing power while the opposite is true for 
targets. 
3.1.5 Market for Corporate Control and Undervalued Target 
Market for corporate control and Undervalued Target. Fama and Jensen (1983) as described in 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) define corporate control as “having the rights to determine the 
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corporate resources – that is the rights to hire, fire and set compensation of top-level managers”. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest that the takeover market is an effective disciplinary method 
for management to aim for shareholder value; enables transfer of poorly managed resources to 
more efficiently ran corporations. Consistent with this theory, Andrade and Stafford (2003) find 
evidence which suggest that firms with high Tobin’s q (proxy q) are more likely to engage in 
M&A as acquirers. Furthermore, Danzon et al (2007) conclude that underperforming firms, 
measured by a low Tobin’s q, are more prone to be targets. Evidence suggests that target 
companies are usually acquired when they are perceived as undervalued and Tobin’s q is here a 
good proxy to assess undervaluation, where a low q indicates that a firm is performing below its 
potential value. 
3.1.6 Corporate / Strategic Focus 
Corporate / Strategic Focus is a much studied subject in M&A activity; researchers have tried to 
account for the effect that it has in determining a merger. Strategic focus will vary depending on 
the nature of competition in each industry. Berry (2000) in an event study of 21 US electric 
utility mergers argues that a combination of a gas and electric utility can provide a one-stop 
shopping for customers looking for an energy provider in a related diversification manner. Berry 
(2000) finds evidence to support this statement, as the stock price around the announcement of 
an electric/gas merger is positive and significant. He concludes that shareholders perceive 
profitable opportunities from electric/gas mergers as the two industries converge. Within the 
European energy industry Verde (2007) perceives a trend that he calls inter-industry M&A 
where mainly gas and electric companies converge. Verde (2007) argues that this strategy can be 
explained by electricity companies attempting to secure supply and minimize risks supplying 
natural gas while gas companies get access to a captive market; resulting in vertically integrated 
companies. Burns et al (1998) analyze post performance of utility mergers and acquisition during 
the period from 1981 to 1993. Interestingly, the study shows that, unlike in unregulated 
industries, bundling mergers such as a gas/electric one increase value. Conglomerate mergers, as 
in other industries, destroy shareholder value and Horizontal and Vertical mergers show 
insignificant change. 
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3.1.7 Deregulation 
Deregulation is an industry shock that is often cited as a reason for industry consolidation via 
mergers and acquisitions. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) have found evidence through an analysis 
of the M&A activity in the last century that mergers strongly occur within industry waves due to 
industry shocks. A change in an industry is defined as being a shock when it modifies the 
industry structure. Examples of industry shocks are technological changes, deregulation and 
severe variation in input prices. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) find significant evidence to 
suggest that broad factors such as deregulation drive an important amount of M&A activity. In 
further research and consistent with these latter results, Leggio and Lien (2000) in an event study 
of the announcement effect of M&A occurred during 1983 to 1996 in US electric utilities, find 
supporting evidence to state that targets of regulated industries earn positive abnormal returns 
but returns are not as large as those in a non-regulated industries. Leggio and Lien (2000) 
suggest that the lengthy process of a regulated merger to receive approval from regulators and 
shareholders along with the merger requiring to be in the best interest of rate payers reduces the 
attractiveness of the deal. They also affirm that traditionally regulated utilities began diversifying 
into unregulated industries where returns are not set by regulators. 
Tax motivation as a determinant of merger activity is a reason often brought uo by management 
in order to fundament an acquisition. Gilson et al (1988) have shown the benefits of tax factors in 
M&A activity as described in Gaughan (2002).  
Hubris Hypothesis comes as a motivation for merger activity when management is thought to be 
willing to create “empire building”. Research has shown that company size is positively 
correlated with management salary; additionally, size factor increases the resources under 
management control. Hubris hypothesis is thought to drive some acquisitions in the takeover 
activity. 
3.2     M&A Determinants in the Energy Industry and Hypotheses Generation 
In the previous section we outlined a brief review of research investigating reasons driving M&A 
activity. Even though we describe studies made on energy companies, most of the research 
previously discussed is based on across industries studies or it concentrates on certain industries 
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such as the pharmaceutical one. In order to construct a set of variables that add explanatory 
power specifically for the energy industry, we now turn to discuss the applicable factors 
affecting the industry and the measures we consider for each of them. 
Economies of Scale are often used as a motive for M&A activity in all industries; therefore, we 
would expect to see smaller companies being more active acquirers than larger firms which are 
supposed to be working on their highest efficient capacity. These small firms would acquire 
other or merge in an attempt to achieve lower costs of production given their potential 
production output. According to Verde (2008) given the process of liberalization in the European 
energy industry, firms have aimed to broaden their activities by having a bigger presence in the 
market and lowering their risks of being taken over.  
H1. Relatively small companies are more active in the market for corporate control 
H1a.Smaller companies would be more active acquirers in an attempt to achieve economies of 
scale 
As mentioned earlier, Excess Capacity has been found to drive some of the M&A in certain 
industries in some markets. This capacity creates the need to fill in those “gaps” in production 
and pushes the company to add market for the firm. As energy firms are capital intensive by 
nature, in order not to decrease the asset productivity they are forced to look for ways to keep it 
at an acceptable level. We measure excess capacity by the change in percentage change in sales 
from the previous year since a relatively slow sales growth would suggest that the productivity of 
assets will soon be declining. A high Tobin’s q (proxy) is our second measure for this variable. 
We expect high q firms, which outperform their peers, to be working close to their limit capacity. 
On the other hand, low q firms with few growth opportunities will decrease their asset 
productivity. A third measure for excess capacity is the percentage change in operating profit; a 
firm that expects low sales growth and given the high fixed costs in the industry, would 
experience excess capacity while decreasing its operating profit. Our fourth and final measure for 
this variable is the ratio of sales to assets. According to Brealy and Myers (1996) a firm with a 
high ratio of sales to assets could signal that it is working close to capacity. 
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H2. Firms facing excess capacity would engage in M&A activity to fill in the gaps in production 
output 
H2a. Companies with a slow growth of sales would be more active acquirers 
H2b. Low q firms would more likely engage in M&A activity 
H2c. Firms with declining operating profit would more likely engage in M&A activity 
H2d. Companies with a high sales to assets ratio are more prone not to engage in any M&A 
activity 
Specific asset acquisition is based on the rationale of a firm having access to a certain valuable 
advantage deriving from acquiring another firm. The range of valuable assets is wide, going from 
a specific market area to obtaining an already established production capacity. In the energy 
sector, researchers have found that certain strategic objectives are achieved by merging 
companies. Given the deregulation process that is taking place in the EU energy industry; this 
element has become an important focus of research in the industry. Deregulation, as we have 
discussed earlier, is an industry shock driving M&A activity. We argue that deregulation makes 
certain firm assets more attractive for other firms. For instance, Leggio and Lien (2000) have 
found evidence suggesting that electric utilities have diversified into unregulated businesses 
where the return on equity is not predetermined by regulators. Leggio and Lien (2000) suggest 
that the reason why electric utilities earn negative returns around the announcement of a merger 
is that they operate in a regulated environment. For the purposes of this study, the existing 
research and based on the readily available data we treat the variables of specific asset 
acquisition and deregulation as one. Existing research leads us to believe that deregulation is an 
important factor driving M&A in the industry. Therefore, we would expect to see a higher 
merger propensity in companies operating in non regulated countries where process for energy 
projects approval and government intervention is low relative while the opposite is true for 
regulated nations.  
H3. Firms in deregulated countries are more likely to engage in M&A 
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Financing and Agency issues are the following theories that we test in the regression analysis. 
Financing theory tells us that firms with excess cash would be more likely to undertake 
investments even if these have a negative net present value. Consequently, and consistently with 
Verde’s (2007) hypothesis, we would expect the firms with larger free cash flows to engage 
more frequently in M&A even if they destroy shareholder value. We measure cash capacity by 
the ratio of cash to sales of a firm. This is a direct measure of a firm’s most liquid asset. Further, 
research on M&A has found that firms with unused debt capacity tend to engage in M&A more 
frequently than firms with high levels of debt. We measure debt capacity by the book value of 
debt to the book value of equity of a firm. We would expect to find firms with low ratios of debt 
to equity acquiring other firms more actively. 
H4.High levels of cash drive firms to be active acquirers 
H4a. Highly leveraged firms are more likely not to engage in M&A activity 
Market for corporate control theory proposes that in a perfect market poorly managed resources 
are to be transferred to more competent management. This theory suggests that underperforming 
firms are more likely to be targets while strong and financially healthy firms would be more 
active acquirers. We measure a firm’s performance in four ways. Our first measure is the market 
to book value ratio as a proxy for Tobin’s q. Low Tobin’s q firms are companies with low 
expected growth opportunities and therefore outperformed by their peers and more likely to be 
targets. This could also indicate that a firm is below its potential value and therefore more 
appealing to be acquired. A second measure is the percentage change in operating profit from 
year   t-1 to t0. A decrease in operating profit would indicate poorly managed firms. The third 
measurement is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to t0 proposing that a firm with a 
high growth of sales has high expectations of strong performance. The energy industry being a 
capital intensive business, we add a fourth and final measure a ratio for the efficient use of 
assets. We expect the ratio of Return on Assets (Net income over assets) to give a direct 
evaluation of the management’s ability to use assets in an efficient way. 
H5. Weak performers are more likely to be engaged in M&A 
H5a. Low q firms are more likely to be targets 
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H5b. Targets show a decrease in operating profit as a pre-merger characteristic 
H5c. Targets would show a lagging percentage change in sales  
H5d. Firms with low ROA are more prone to be targets 
Corporate / Strategic focus is a variable suitable for event studies. There is some research on the 
energy industry that uses event studies to measure the value creation in mergers given certain 
corporate focus such as horizontal, vertical, conglomerate or bundled. These studies, however, 
concentrate on merger information exclusively and do not address the factors driving M&A 
activity in reference to non merging firms. This variable is not included in our study given that 
non merging firms in our sample would not have a value and therefore the result would not be 
valid.  
Tax motivation is a rationale that helps driving mergers, however, whether a transaction can be 
executed free of tax or not is a case by case assessment out of the scope of this study. Readily 
available data was not found in this respect and this factor cannot be taken into account. 
Hubris hypothesis proposes top management’s desire for empire building as a reason for M&A 
activity. Given the highly qualitative feature of this variable it is not possible to determine 
whether a company’s management is affected by this hypothesis in its decisions or not. This 
variable has been disregarded in our study. 
We have included all the variables that based on theory and the energy industry’s characteristics 
add the most explanatory power to our study.  
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Hypotheses summary 
Hypothesis 1. Relatively small companies are more active in the market for corporate control 
Hypothesis 1a.Smaller companies would be more active acquirers to achieve economies of 
scale 
Hypothesis 2. Firms facing excess capacity would engage in M&A activity to fill in 
production gaps 
Hypothesis 2a. Companies with a slow growth of sales would be more active acquirers 
Hypothesis 2b. Low q firms would more likely engage in M&A activity 
Hypothesis 2c. Firms with declining operating profit would more likely engage in M&A 
Hypothesis 2d.High sales to assets ratio firms are more likely not to engage in any M&A 
activity 
Hypothesis 3. Firms in deregulated countries are more likely to engage in M&A 
Hypothesis 4.High levels of cash drive firms to be active acquirers 
Hypothesis 4a. Highly leveraged firms are more likely not to engage in M&A activity 
Hypothesis 5. Weak performers are more likely to be engaged 
Hypothesis 5a. Low q firms are more likely to be targets 
Hypothesis 5b. Targets show an decrease in operating profit as a pre-merger characteristic 
Hypothesis 5c. Targets would show a lagging percentage change in sales 
Hypothesis 5d. Firms with low ROA are more prone to be targets 
  Exhibit 2: Summary of the hypotheses 
It is important to notice that even though there are overlapping measurements for distinct 
variables; the only mutually exclusive outcome is in the hypotheses 2a and 5c where the theories 
of excess capacity and market for corporate control diverge in the interpretation of the variable 
percentage change in sales. We test in this study the relevance of these hypotheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 21  
 
4. Methodology and Data Collection 
In this chapter we describe the methodology used in our research. We here describe distinctively 
how we approached our study, giving a description, justification, and the steps followed in the 
data collection and the choice of regression analysis used.  
4.1 Research Approach 
The aim of this study is to find the determinants of mergers and acquisitions in the energy 
industry as previously stated. In order to achieve this goal, a quantitative approach has been 
adopted. Thus, there was a need for gathering the industry’s empirical data and processing this 
data using a type of regression to obtain the adequate type of results. Our study is focused on the 
European energy industry, as we believe that the study of M&A in a specific continent is more 
relevant because the determinants for undertaking this type of activity can vary across regions, 
leading to in inconclusive results. For the same reason, we believe that studies on M&A should 
be conducted on industries independently, where energy is a good example of an industry with 
large geographic differences.  
It is important to add that this type of study relies on data of publicly listed companies, therefore 
not representing the whole population in the market involved in M&A activity. Any reached 
conclusion concerns and can only be related to publicly listed companies. 
4.2 Research Method 
The methodology used in our study is motivated by similar studies that were done in the field of 
M&A. In order to pinpoint the forces driving a firm to be involved in the takeover market we use 
a quantitative approach and to a lesser extent a qualitative one. 
The quantitative data relies on accounting information and gives an objective outcome for the 
research. On the other hand, the qualitative dimension allows us to bring in a strategic and 
political dimension to the study. 
The following sections will present a detailed description of the methodology used. 
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4.2.1 The Source of Information 
In order to accomplish our research, both financial data and theoretical background were needed. 
The information was gathered from sources that are considered reliable. In addition, some 
financial ratios used were calculated from the data extracted from these databases. The following 
databases were used in order to conduct our study: 
Database Description 
Thomson Financial DataStream Extraction of complete financial information about 
companies such as balance sheets, income 
statements, ratios, and some other information as 
market value for example 
Reuters 3000Xtra Extraction of description and information about all 
M&A activities that occurred during the specified 
time frame 
ELIN@Lund Lund University database for searching and 
obtaining articles 
SSRN (www.ssrn.com) Database for searching and obtaining articles 
      Table 1: Sources of information 
4.2.2 The Sample and Excluded Observations 
Our study regards the listed companies in the 27 member states of the European Union plus 
Norway and Switzerland. Following is a list of all the countries included: 
Countries Included in the Study 
Austria Denmark Greece Lithuania Poland Spain 
Belgium Estonia Hungary Luxembourg Portugal Sweden 
Bulgaria Finland Ireland Malta Romania Switzerland 
Cyprus France Italy Netherlands Slovakia UK 
Czech Republic Germany Latvia Norway Slovenia  
Table 2: Countries included in the study 
Page | 23  
 
In order to get a sample for our study, several collection and processing steps were done. 
Following is a description of what is considered as sectors of the energy industry under the 
Datastream classification: 
• Electricity 
• Oil & Gas Producers 
• Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 
 
The first step involved gathering financial data, between the years 1995 and 2005, for all 
companies within the energy industry and within the geographical boundaries. For that purpose, 
Thomson Financial DataStream was used. We decided to exclude companies that did not reach a 
market value higher than $100 million at least once throughout the period, as a measure to secure 
sample reliability. Danzon et al (2007) did the same procedure for their biotech and 
pharmaceuticals companies sample by excluding the ones that never had net sales of at least $20 
million in any year during the sample period and never had an enterprise value of at least $1 
billion claiming that they are limiting their sample to firms with significant economic value. 
The following table gives a summary of our sample data which consists of 1957 firm-years of 
302 firms: 
Countries Number of firms in 
the initial sample 
Number of firms 
excluded 
Number of firms in 
the final sample 
Austria 5 0 5 
Belgium 9 3 6 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 
Cyprus 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 22 5 17 
Denmark 4 1 3 
Estonia 1 0 1 
Finland 4 0 4 
France 23 5 18 
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Germany 29 5 24 
Greece 8 0 8 
Hungary 5 0 5 
Ireland 9 2 7 
Italy 27 1 26 
Latvia 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 3 2 1 
Malta 0 0 0 
Netherlands 4 1 3 
Norway 16 4 12 
Poland 10 1 9 
Portugal 3 0 3 
Romania 0 0 0 
Slovakia 0 0 0 
Slovenia 2 0 2 
Spain 21 2 19 
Sweden 13 4 9 
Switzerland 16 3 13 
UK 161 54 107 
Total firms in the sample 395 93 302 
Table 3: Number of firms in the sample before and after exclusions 
Of these 1957 firm-years that were gathered, 376 firm-years were excluded given the missing 
data for at least one of the variables used, making them invalid for the regression analysis. At the 
end, our sample consisted of 1581 firm-years. 
Afterwards, M&A deals that occurred between 1995 and 2005 needed to be extracted. Reuters 
3000Xtra was used for that purpose. In order not to exclude deals where non-European 
companies are involved as either a target or an acquirer, where the counterpart is a European 
company, two steps were conducted. First, we collected the list of M&A deals in the energy 
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industry where European companies were acquirers. Then we gathered the deals where the target 
was a European company. In order to get concrete M&A deals we excluded the ones that were 
considered as only “investments” by Reuters. These investments are basically the accumulation 
of a firm’s stocks by another firm and therefore do not imply a merger of operations that would 
require reorganization, so they were not considered. At last, 990 deals were collected from 
Reuters 3000Xtra of which 795 were involving European companies as acquirers and 743 were 
involving European companies as targets. The two last figures includes the 555 cases where both 
the acquirer and target are from the EU. We then take the 302 companies in our sample and 
match them with merger events for each company year.  
 
The M&A deals were gathered from the following Reuters’ classifications:   
• Energy          
 
o Energy equipment and services 
 Oil and gas drilling 
 Oil and gas equipment and services 
 
o Oil and gas 
 Coal and consumable fuels 
 Integrated oil and gas 
 Oil and gas exploration and production 
 Oil and gas refining and marketing 
 Oil and gas storage and transportation 
 
 
 
 
• Utilities 
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o Electric utilities 
o Gas utilities 
o Independent power producers and energy traders 
o Multi-utilities 
o Water utilities 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
In the following sub-sections we describe the choice of regression we use, as well as the items of 
this chosen regression method. 
4.3.1 Choice of Regression Model 
As mentioned before, other studies were of assistance when settling for the methodology used. 
The multinomial logistic regression analysis allows us to have the freedom required to determine 
the outcome required. The analysis consents more than two different outcomes modeled by the 
independent variables and therefore it is appropriate to use it in this type of study. 
This kind of regression was used in some similar other studies, of these we can cite: 
• Size, Target Performance and European Bank Mergers and Acquisitions. (Azofra et al, 2008) 
• Accounting for distress in bank mergers. (Koetter et al, 2007) 
• Determinants of bank growth choice. (Wansley et al, 2000) 
• Determinants of merger and acquisition activity in Australian cooperative deposit-taking 
institutions. (Worthington, 2002) 
 
This multinomial logistic regression model can be a useful tool for modeling where the 
dependent variable is a discrete set of more than two choices (Agresti, 1996). In our case, the 
dependant variable, that will be discussed in the next section, is whether the firm is an acquirer, 
target, or is not involved in an M&A activity. So clearly, when you have a dependant variable 
that is nominal and not dichotomous or binary, with more than two different outcomes possible, 
the multinomial logistic regression is the type of regression that should be used. 
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The multinomial model has been used for many years in economics, but is used less often in 
finance. (Wansley et al, 2000). The model was developed by McFadden (1973) in his study of 
consumer choice according to Wansley et al (2000). 
 
We use the book “applied logistic regression” of Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) to illustrate this 
regression. In order to conduct the multinomial logistic regression, a reference group should be 
chosen. It is usually the largest group or what is called the control group; it is the group to which 
the others are compared to. In our case, it would be comparing the group of companies that 
acquired or that were targeted with the companies that were not involved in any kind of M&A 
activity given that this group reflects a good benchmark for assessing merger decisions. In order 
to further exemplify this regression and if we assume that we have p covariates and x is a 
constant term of length p+1 where            , the two logistic functions are: 
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(3) 
 
 
 
 
So if there are three different outcomes Y= (0, 1, 2) for dependant variable with the group having 
Y=0 as the reference group, the conditional probability of each group is: 
 
 
 
(4) 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Dependent Variable 
Our dependant variable is if a firm is involved in a M&A activity, specifying which type of 
activity it is (acquirer or target) and under which firm year it occurred. We decided to call this 
variable ACT on behalf of “activity” and it will take the following outcomes for each case: 
• Value of 0: If there was no M&A activity on that specific firm-year. The group having 
the variable 0 will serve as a reference (or control) group for the other groups. Having the 
largest group as the reference is the most common and it also correct to compare 
companies that were involved in M&A activity with those that were not. 
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• Value of 1: If there was a M&A activity on a specific firm-year and the firm involved 
was an acquirer. 
• Value of 2: If there was a M&A activity on a specific firm-year and the firm involved 
was a Target. 
 
4.3.3 Independent Variables 
On the other side of the regression formula the variables that are explaining the outcome of the 
dependant variable are listed. Concerning the choice of these variables, the following is the list 
and description of each variable: 
• The natural logarithm of the total market value of the firm: 
Log(MV) The natural logarithm of the market value is used instead of the market value 
in $US. We faced the problem of having firms with very high market values compared to 
the smallest firms’ market values. In order to avoid heteroskedasticity we have calculated 
the logarithm of these values, making the variance among numbers considerably smaller 
and adding reliability to the results. 
• Market to book value of equity: 
This variable will be used to explain two motives behind M&A 
in the energy industry and they are the excess capacity and the 
market for corporate control. Datastream database contains a market to book value of 
equity that excludes intangibles, but we calculated our own given that firms include 
intangibles when considering which companies to acquire.  
• Change in sales 
This variable will also be used to explain two motives behind M&A 
acitivities in the energy industry, specifically the excess capacity and 
the market for corporate control hypotheses. 
 
 
 
 
Equity of ValueBook 
Equity of ValueMarket 
1-t
1-tt
Sales
Sales - Sales
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• Change in operating profit 
This variable will be used to explain the same 
theories as the percentage change in sales. 
• Sales to assets 
 This variable will be used to explain the excess capacity motive for 
undertaking M&A activity. 
• Return on assets 
 This variable will be used to explain the market for corporate control 
motive for being involved in M&A activity.  
• Cash to sales 
This variable will explain the financing motive on being involved 
in M&A activity. 
• Debt over equity 
This variable will explain the agency motive in being involved in  
M&A activity. 
• Deregulation 
Dummy variable used to explain the specific asset acquisition motive and that takes a 
value of 0 if the company is operating in a deregulated country and 1 if the company is 
operating in a regulated country.  
 
4.3.4 Summary of the variables 
To conclude this section, we present here a table with all the variables used in our regression 
with a description and a list of supportive theory for each one of them: 
Variable Description Supportive theory 
Dependant variable   
 
• Activity (ACT) 
Outcome dependant on whether a 
company is an acquirer, target, or not 
involved in any M&A activity 
 
- 
1-t
1-tt
Profit Operating
Profit Operating - Profit Operating
Assets Total
Sales
Assets Total
IncomeNet 
Assets Total
Equivalent andCash 
equity of Book value
debt of Book value
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Explanatory variables   
• Market Value 
(log(MV)) 
Natural logarithm of the total market 
value of the firm in USD 
(Mahoney& McComick, 
1988) / (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983) 
• Market to book value 
of equity (MTB) Equity of ValueBook 
Equity of ValueMarket 
 
(Andrade & Stafford, 
2004) / (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983) 
• % Change in sales 
(CS) 
 
1-t
1-tt
Sales
Sales - Sales
 
(Andrade & Stafford, 
2004)  / (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983) 
• % Change in 
operating profit 
(COP) 
1-t
1-tt
Profit Operating
Profit Operating - Profit Operating
 
(Andrade & Stafford, 
2004) / (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983) 
• Sales to assets (STA) 
Assets Total
Sales
 
(Andrade & Stafford, 
2004) / (Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983) 
• Return on assets 
(ROA) Assets Total
IncomeNet 
 
(Jensen & Ruback, 1983) 
• Cash to sales (CTS) 
Assets Total
Equivalent andCash 
 
(Jensen, 1986) 
• Debt to equity (DTE) 
equity of Book value
debt of Book value
 
(Jensen, 1986) 
• Deregulation (DR) 
dummy variable 
0 if the company is operating in a 
deregulated country and 1 if the 
company is operating in a regulated 
country 
(Verde 2008, McLaughin 
1995 and others) 
Table 4: Description and supportive theory of the variables used in the study 
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4.3.5 The regression equation 
Now that we discussed all the items and features of our regression equation, we draw a final 
regression function according to the set of variables discussed previously and the function 
modeled by Azofra et al (2008) in their study of European Bank Mergers and Acquisitions:
 
 
 
(5)  
         Where  1,2;k 0,1,2;j ;1581,....,1 ===i  (Λ .) the multinomial logistic function 
4.4 Reliability and Validity 
To ensure the quality of a work as well as its accuracy, one should prove the reliability and 
validity of the study.  
4.4.1 Reliability 
The gathering of data was extracted from valid databases. The financial information about firms 
was only taken from Thomson Financial Datastream, and the list of M&A deals that occurred 
during our studied period was taken only from Reuters 3000Xtra.  
The processing of data was done the same way for all companies, with a standardized Excel 
spreadsheet including all the data we needed in our research. 
There was an omission of the variables that turned out to have poor explanatory power after 
running our regression for the first time. 
4.4.2 Validity 
A sample of 302 firms was gathered, which represents the whole European energy industry less 
the firms in the same industry with a market value that never exceeds $100 million, to keep the 
firms with significant economic value. 
Comparison between our sample and other samples of similar studies shows that we can consider 
ours as being valid. Andrade (2004) had 2969 firms but across-industries and for a longer time 
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period  (between 1970 and 1994) but Danzon et al (2007) had 383 firms in their one industry 
sample though for a longer time period as well (between 1988 to 2001).  
Variables taken are measures that are considered as representatives of the theory that has been 
tested in the field. In addition several tests were conducted to ensure the validity of our choice as 
well. A correlation matrix to ensure non-correlation of the variables as well as a T-test to 
examine if the means of the groups are statistically different is performed. There was a focus on 
only one region, that is Europe, for the industry chosen to ensure that the companies studied have 
similar regulatory and business environment in order to let us draw solid conclusions about our 
findings that might be biased if several geographical locations are taken; for instance, comparing 
the US market to the Asian one. A valid econometric model was used. As stated in the choice of 
regression section, the multinomial logistic regression is the method that was used in similar 
studies and thus can be considered as valid.  
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5. Empirical Findings and Analysis 
This chapter presents the results found in the regression analysis performed and the consequent 
analysis of the determinants for M&A. It starts by defining some key concepts for interpretation 
of the model and descriptive statistics of our sample followed by the outline of results from the 
regression. Finally we analyze the results in respect to the theoretical background in the field. 
5.1 Empirical Findings 
5.1.1 Statistical Key Terms 
The significance factor Sig. represents the probability of a variable affecting the outcome in the 
population. Different levels of significance are used among researchers to assess the importance 
of an independent variable influencing the dependant one. For the purposes of this study we will 
consider a level of less than 90% as not significant, as generally agreed by in statistics literature 
in this type of studies. Table 5 outlines the Sig. values and their significant probabilities. 
 
 
 
 
                                     Table 5. Significance Factor and Probabilities considered 
B coefficients are the estimated coefficients for the model. In the logistic regression model this 
coefficient is measured against the reference category, which in our case is the largest group; 
including those that were not involved in M&A activity. 
Odds ratios are an important characteristic in the multinomial logistic model. In the software 
used in this study, this ratio is represented by Exp(B). In general terms, if an odds ratio of a 
coefficient is > 1 it indicates that a unit increase in the variable will raise the probability of the 
Significance Confidence interval Sign 
≤ 0.01 99% *** 
≤ 0.05 95% ** 
≤ 0.10 90% * 
≥ 0.10 No Significance  
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outcome falling into that group in comparison to the reference group. On the other hand, if an 
odds ratio is < 1 it would indicate that the probability of the outcome falling into that category 
reduces as a unit increase in the variable is added. 
5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the variables are shown in Table 6 
Descriptive statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
LOGMV 1581 3.1748 8.3414 5.8582 0.9212 
MTB 1581 -6.7804 51.6586 2.1784 2.6061 
CS 1581 -0.9837 872.4166 1.397 25.1062 
COP 1581 -167.8769 444 0.643 13.1326 
STA 1581 -0.3224 4.8593 0.6015 0.5641 
ROA 1581 -2.4119 0.4501 0.0303 0.1398 
CTS 1581 -15.5538 1406.8622 2.4298 42.7522 
DTE 1581 -27.9594 32.7197 0.7971 1.8734 
Valid N(listwise) 1581 
    
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the sample using SPSS 
For the dummy variable of whether a firm is in a regulated country or not, our sample is 
composed by 68% and 32% of regulated and unregulated firm years respectively. The number of 
acquirers and targets is shown in Table 7. 
Case Processing Summary 
 
N Marginal percentage 
ACT                   0 1315 83.20% 
                          1 222 14% 
                          2 44 2.80% 
Valid 1581 100% 
Missing  0  
Total  1581  
Subpopulation 1572 a 
a The dependant variable has only one value observed in 1572(100%) 
subpopulations 
                              Table 7: The case processing summary using SPSS 
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As previously discussed in the methodology chapter, companies that did not have a market value 
of at least 100 million USD during the timeframe were not taken into account. Even though that 
limitation was set, some wide differences can still be found in some independent variables. Two 
types of procedures in this case are discussed in research; truncation of data and leaving the data 
in its raw form (Tucker 1996). We have decided not to remove “unwanted” firm years since that 
would represent a reduction in the validity of our model. Deleting unwanted extreme values to 
smooth the sample ignores the real life conditions that allow these extreme situations to take 
place. 
5.1.3 Correlation Matrix of the Variables  
We check for multicolinearity and can conclude that correlation exists to an insignificant extent 
among our independent variables (See table 8). Generally, multicolinearity increases the standard 
errors for coefficient estimators and since our goal is to explain determinants of mergers, the low 
degrees are important for the explanatory reliability. The variables correlated to the highest 
degree are Debt to Equity and Market to Book, at a 99% significance level, but the deree (0,258) 
does not cause our concern for further analysis.  
Correlations 
 LOGMV MTB CS COP STA ROA CTS DTE REG 
LOGMV 1         
MTB 0.147 1        
CS -0.270 0.050 1       
COP -0.100 -0.017 0.008 1      
STA 0.131 0.005 -0.022 0.038 1     
ROA 0.239 -0.003 -0.025 0.034 0.101 1    
CTS -0.250 0.011 -0.002 -0.017 -0.056 -0.046 1   
DTE 0.087 0.258 0.006 0.001 -0.066 -0.059 -0.020 1  
REG 0.180 -0.047 0.022 -0.025 0.094 0.025 -0.035 0.023 1 
Table 8: The correlation matrix for the variables using SPSS 
5.1.4 T-test for the Variables 
The variables did not have high degrees of correlation, which otherwise would have implied low 
t-statistics when running the One-sample test. Instead the test shows, that there is significance 
and that the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
Page | 37  
 
T-test for the variables 
     95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
 t df Sig.(2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper 
LOGMV 252.837 1580 0.000 5.858 5.813 5.904 
MTB 33.237 1580 0.000 2.178 2.050 2.307 
CS 2.213 1580 0.027 1.397 0.159 2.636 
COP 1.947 1580 0.052 0.643 -0.005 1.291 
STA 42.403 1580 0.000 0.602 0.574 0.629 
ROA 8.617 1580 0.000 0.030 0.023 0.037 
CTS 2.260 1580 0.024 2.430 0.321 4.539 
DTE 16.919 1580 0.000 0.797 0.705 0.890 
REG 27.549 1580 0.000 0.324 0.300 0.350 
Table 9: The T-test for the variables using SPSS 
5.1.5 Regression Results 
We now turn to describe the results from the regression analysis performed. The multinomial 
logistic model allows us to distinguish between several outcomes. In this case, recall that we 
have determined three possible results: being an acquirer, being a target and not being involved 
in any of those. We have assigned the group number 0 for an outcome of no M&A activity, 
group 1 for acquirers and group 2 for the outcome target. When testing for all the nine variables 
described, the regression yields the results presented in the table in the appendix (Appendix 1). 
The regression results have more success explaining the reasons behind these strategic decisions 
for acquirers than for the targets. The sample includes mergers in the European energy industry 
for the period 1995 to 2005 where targets are few in comparison to acquirers. This is due to 
reasons such as the fact that some of the targets in the energy sector were not listed companies 
and energy companies making diversifying acquisitions outside the industry this study 
comprises.  
When focusing first on acquirers, we find that four of the nine variables show significance 
affecting the outcome. Both market value (LOGMV) and percentage change in sales (CS) show 
significance at the 99% level and also a positive relation to the acquirer outcome. The variable 
for market to book value (MTB) is significant at the 95% level with a negative coefficient and 
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finally at the 90% level the cash to sales (CS) variable shows some impact with a weak positive 
relation. In the case of the targets, the results yield significance only for the market value 
variable. (Appendix 1) 
In order to construct a model that comprises the most powerful explanatory variables, we present 
the results of a regression that includes only the variables that appeared significant in the first 
analysis plus the variables return on assets (ROA) and Debt to Equity (DTE) which show the 
closest results to the 90% level among the non significant variables. The results of this analysis 
are presented in Table 10. 
In this second analysis the variables that had shown significance are still important in the model. 
Furthermore, the variable DTE appears significant at the 90% level and positively related to 
being an acquirer. The variable ROA shows a strong coefficient but remains insignificant. 
Finally in the case of the outcome target the only significant variable is still market value, 
although it appears now within the 95% level. 
         95% Confidence 
Interval for Exp(B) 
ACT 
a 
B 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig 
Exp 
(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 Intercept -9.339 0.627 221.577 1  0.000    
 LOGMV 1.252 0.099 160.243 1 *** 0.000 3.469 2.88 4.244 
 MTB -0.122 0.050 6.042 1 ** 0.014 0.885 0.803 0.976 
 CS 0.029 0.009 10.97 1 *** 0.001 1.03 1.012 1.047 
 ROA -1.044 0.768 1.846 1  0.174 0.352 0.078 1.587 
 CTS 0.02 0.001 3.466 1 * 0.063 1.002 1 1.005 
 DTE 0.089 0.052 2.881 1 * 0.090 1.093 0.986 1.211 
2 Intercept -5.328 1.065 25.023 1  0.000    
 LOGMV 0.376 0.184 4.182 1 ** 0.041 1.456 1.016 2.087 
 MTB -0.163 0.116 1.971 1  0.160 0.85 0.677 1.067 
 CS 0.006 0.034 0.034 1  0.855 1.006 0.942 1.075 
 ROA 1.226 2.338 0.275 1  0.600 3.406 0.035 332.781 
 CTS -0.003 0.017 0.023 1  0.879 0.997 0.965 1.031 
 DTE -0.004 0.100 0.002 1  0.967 0.996 0.818 1.213 
a. The reference category is: 0 
Table 10: The regression results for the significant variables using SPSS 
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5.2     Analysis of Results 
Economies of scale are measured by the logarithm of market value of firms in this study. Based 
on the hypothesis that a larger production capacity gives a firm the advantage of lowering the 
costs per unit produced, we expected to find smaller companies being more active in the M&A 
activities. The coefficients for market value in the regression both for the acquirers and targets 
are significant and strongly positive. Contrary to what economies of scale would predict, larger 
firms are more likely to be both acquirers and targets in the market for corporate control. Based 
on the odds ratios, a firm that increases by one unit its LOGMV would raise its risk of becoming 
a target by a factor of 1.456. These results strongly suggest that larger firms are more likely to be 
involved in both types of merger activities. This outcome is supported by the idea that once the 
EU energy market is a single and liberalized one, being a pan-European player is important 
(Verde 2007). The strong and positive coefficient for LOGMV suggests that if market value 
increases by one unit a firm would increase its risk to become an acquirer by a factor of 3.496. 
The evidence found is consistent with Danzon et al (2004) whose results indicate that larger 
firms measured by enterprise value are more likely to be involved in all types of merger 
activities.  
H1. Relatively small companies are more active in the market for corporate control – Rejected 
H1a. Smaller companies would be more active acquirers in an attempt to achieve economies of 
scale – Rejected 
 
Excess Capacity is in this research measured by four variables: Percentage change in sales (CS), 
Tobin’s q proxy (MTB), percentage change in operating profit (COP) and the ratio of sales to 
assets (STA). The outcome of the regression analysis finds the Hypothesis 2 to be slightly 
supported, the explanatory variables and their interpretation is described below. 
H2. Firms facing excess capacity would engage in M&A activity to fill in the gaps in production 
output – Supported to some extent 
 
For the first variable, the coefficient for percentage change in sales is significant but weak when 
finding it as a driver for merger activity. Our results show that an increase in sales by one unit 
would increase a firm’s risk to become an acquirer by a factor of 1.030 given that other variables 
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are held constant. We find a positive relation between a firm’s increase in sales and engaging in 
acquisitions but it is not a strong determinant for the activity to take place. The outcome is 
inconsistent with Andrade et al (2004) who in their study find a strong positive coefficient in 
sales growth, which they interpret as a driver for acquisitions based on managerial optimism.  
H2a. Companies with a slow growth of sales would be more active acquirers – Rejected 
Based on the proxy for Tobin’s q and the excess capacity hypothesis for M&A activity, we 
would expect to see high q firms to be working close to capacity and therefore avoid merger 
activities. Additionally, this measure is also a direct interpretation of expected growth 
opportunities for a firm. Therefore, a low q firm would be experiencing excess capacity and be 
expected to broaden it given the poor growth opportunities that the market forecasts for the 
company. The significant and negative coefficient for our Tobin’s q proxy (MTB) suggests that a 
firm that increases its q by one unit would also decrease its risk of engaging in M&A activity. 
Specifically, a unit increase in the MTB ratio reduces the risk of becoming an acquirer in 
comparison to not being involved in any type of activity by a factor of 0.885. In the case of 
targets, we find a similar case with a unit increase in MTB decreasing the likelihood of falling in 
the group of targets. However, in the case of targets even though the coefficient for MTB is 
negative and strong, it remains insignificant at the 90% level.  
H2b. Low q firms would more likely engage in M&A activity – Supported 
 
The percentage change in operating profit does not show significance at any level.  Therefore 
there is no evidence that a decline of this item would drive M&A activity. Danzon et al (2007) 
find mixed results in the their case too, since they propose that a rapid growth of operating 
expenses explains what they call pooling mergers but their outcome was not significant in the 
case of acquirers. 
H2c. Firms with declining operating profit would more likely engage in M&A activity – Not 
significant 
 
The coefficient for the sales to assets ratio (STA) was taken out of the model due to low 
explanatory relevance. The variable not being significant can possibly be explained by the 
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energy industry having long investment horizons, implying that resources or assets are not 
appearing as sales in the near time, making the sales to assets measure dubious.  
H2d. Companies with a high sales to assets ratio are more prone not to engage in any M&A 
activity – Not significant 
 
The outcome of these five variables discussed above partially supports the result found by 
Andrade et al (2004) who argue that consolidation through mergers was due to excess capacity in 
the merger waves of the decades of the 70’s and 80’s. This result is also consistent with Danzon 
et al (2007) who find evidence suggesting that relatively low Tobin’s q firms are more likely 
involved in merger activity. This excess capacity is firm-wise and should not be interpreted as a 
industry-wide characteristic. 
The Specific Asset Acquisition in this study is defined as the tendency of firms operating in 
unregulated countries to participate in the takeover market relative to firms in countries classified 
as regulated. Given the research that Verde (2007) and others have conducted suggesting that 
merger activity in the energy sector is being partially driven by this specific asset acquisition. 
Contrasting to the trend described by some researchers in the field, the variable REG measuring 
this tendency does not show significance and thus there is no evidence that regulation restrains 
M&A activity in the European energy industry, at least not in the time frame considered in this 
study.  
H3. Firms in deregulated countries are more likely to engage in M&A – Not significant 
 
Financing Hypothesis tells us that having high ratios of cash increases the risk of a firm 
becoming an acquirer. Our results support this hypothesis but find the determinant to be 
important to a small degree. The variable cash to sales (CTS) is significant at the 90% level but 
the interpretation of the results does not lead to a conclusion similar to the one made by other 
studies, which is that high levels of cash drive firms to be active acquirers. According to our 
results, an increase of one unit of cash will lead to an increase in the firm’s risk of being an 
acquirer by a factor of 1.002. Cash has a small positive effect determining mergers in the 
European market but it is not an essential driver for acquiring other energy companies; possibly 
because there are other means such as using stock or debt for the financing purpose. 
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H4.High levels of cash drive firms to be active acquirers – Supported 
 
As previously mentioned, cash to sales has a slightly positive effect on firms to engage in 
acquisitions, but a bit surprisingly higher debt to equity drives acquisitions even more. The 
hypothesis for highly leveraged firms not to engage in M&A activity can thereby be discarded. 
According to our results, an increase in one unit of debt to equity would increase the risk of the 
firm being an acquirer by a factor of 1.093 within 90% significance. Reasons for this result could 
be that larger firms tend to be more active in M&A in combination with that larger firms may 
have easier to finance their operations with debt. However, the correlation matrix shows no sign 
of correlation between market value and leverage. We propose that one of the reasons of 
acquiring another company in the energy industry might be to reduce the level of leverage. This 
remains just an assumption as the results for the same variable for targets does not allow us to 
conclude it further. 
Jensen (1986) argues that in the oil industry debt puts pressure on firms as they get obliged to be 
efficient by not undertaking low-return projects. Our results are inconsistent with this proposal. 
For the capital intensive European energy industry, given the studied time period, debt to equity 
levels does not have the same impact on firm’s probability to merge, as they did in prior 
research.   
The business risk may also differ considerably whether a company has core activities in 
exploration or runs transportation utilities. The ability to finance a firm with debt is thereby 
dependent on what core activities the firm runs; this may be an additional reason why more 
highly leveraged firms are more likely to engage in M&A activity. We propose that lower 
business risk companies are more prone to undertake M&A activity. 
H4a. Highly leveraged firms are more likely not to engage in M&A activity – Rejected 
 
Market for corporate control is measured in this study by four variables: Tobin’s q proxy 
(MTB), percentage change in sales (CS), percentage change in operating profit (COP) and return 
on assets ratio (ROA).  
Accordingly with the market for corporate control theoretical background, in an efficient market, 
underperforming firms are more likely to either acquire assets to increase their profitability or 
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become targets transferring resources to more capable management. A firm’s Tobin’s q (market 
to book ratio) is a direct measure of a firm’s expected growth opportunities and thus a proxy for 
performance. Results from the regression find that higher q firms are less likely acquirers in the 
takeover market. A unit increase in the MTB ratio reduces a firm’s risk to become an acquirer by 
a factor of 0.885. The outcome coefficient in the case of targets is negative and thus also 
supportive of this theory. However, it is not as strong as in the acquirers’ case, given that the 
coefficient fails to appear in the 90% significance level.  
H5. Weak performers are more likely to be engaged in M&A - Supported 
H5a. Low q firms are more likely to be targets – Not Significant 
 
A decline in operating profit would be expected from targets given the market for corporate 
control theory. In our results the coefficient supports the statement but it fails to appear within 
the significance level. The outcome does not allow for further explanatory reasons. 
H5b. Targets show a decrease in operating profit as a pre-merger characteristic – Not 
significant  
 
A lagging percentage change in sales (CS) would indicate a firm is more likely to be a target in 
order to transfer resources to more efficient corporations. We find a positive coefficient in the CS 
coefficient supporting the theory; however the coefficient is insignificant. In the case of 
acquirers, the coefficient is positive and significant suggesting that an increase in sales of one 
unit increases the probability of a firm to be an acquirer by a factor of 1.030. 
H5c. Targets would show a lagging percentage change in sales – Not Significant 
 
We expected to find a positive relation between being a target and having low return on assets 
(ROA) given the theory of market for corporate control. However, in the case of targets there is 
no significance in our study to state that. In the case of acquirers, the coefficient ROA is also 
insignificant at the 90% level but a very strong one leading to suggest that an increase in ROA 
decreases the risk of a firm to be an acquirer and makes it more prone to be a target. 
H5d. Firms with low ROA are more prone to be targets – Not significant 
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6. Conclusion and Further Research 
In this final chapter the concluding remarks from the research are presented. Finally, we suggest 
some ideas for further research within the area. 
6.1    Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the determinants for firms to engage in M&A transactions 
with a focus on the European energy industry and based on theories and hypotheses that attempt 
to explain these strategic decisions. The results are partially consistent with previous M&A 
studies in other industries but also have explanatory dimensions that are specific to the energy 
industry.   
Our results show that market value, Tobin’s q, cash to sales, debt to equity ratio, and change in 
sales are drivers for M&A activity to various extents. It appears that performance measurements 
in certain items are more important drivers in the acquisition choice. This may be a response of 
the capital intensity and nature of the business. 
Our results strongly suggest that larger firms are more active players in the takeover market than 
relatively smaller firms. Both acquirers and targets tend to be firms with established positions in 
the market and larger enterprise values. In terms of performance, firms with low expected growth 
opportunities have a stronger tendency to be active in the takeover market. Moreover, the 
outcome shows that relatively high amounts of cash are positively related to being an acquirer. 
This outcome supports in general the financing hypothesis, market for corporate control theory 
and excess capacity proposition. 
Furthermore, the agency hypothesis does not seem to have the effect expected by the theory 
supported. The outcome suggests that higher leverage is positively related to being an acquirer.  
We find no evidence that deregulation is a driver for merger activity suggesting that the specific 
asset acquisition does not have significance in the time frame and industry of the research. A 
corporate focus approach might demonstrate better results in this respect. 
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The study shows that some of the theories for the M&A determinants have explanatory power in 
the Energy industry but adaptation to specific industry context should be addressed. The present 
research adds on to the literature of M&A activity rationale. 
6.2    Further Research 
The European energy industry is an interesting field for research. The industry is experiencing 
changing conditions and it has become a good opportunity for academics to test industry shock 
theories on it. 
An interesting line of research in the industry is to evaluate the importance of the strategic focus 
in the decision process. Firms in the industry are both adopting vertical and horizontal 
integration strategies in an attempt to stay competitive in the single energy market that EU 
commission is supporting.  
This thesis examines exclusively the drivers of merger activity. A study that analyzes the long 
term post performance of these M&A deals can shed some light beyond the abnormal returns for 
stock that event studies measure. 
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8. Appendices 
Appendix 1 
a: The reference category is: 0 
Table 11: The regression results for all variables using SPSS 
 
 
 
         95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Exp(B) 
ACT 
a 
B 
Std. 
Error Wald df Sig 
Exp 
(B) 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
1 Intercept -9.342 0.633 218.12 1  0.000    
 LOGMV 1.257 0.102 151.735 1 *** 0.000 3.516 2.879 4.295 
 MTB -0.118 0.050 5.694 1 ** 0.017 0.888 0.806 0.979 
 CS 0.029 0.009 11.266 1 *** 0.001 1.03 1.012 1.048 
 COP 0.006 0.005 1.805 1  0.179 1.006 0.997 1.015 
 STA -0.098 0.155 0.403 1  0.526 0.906 0.669 1.228 
 ROA -1.029 0.778 1.749 1  0.186 0.357 0.078 1.643 
 CTS 0.002 0.001 3.398 1 * 0.065 1.002 1 1.005 
 DTE 0.083 0.053 2.433 1  0.119 1.087 0.979 1.206 
 REG 0.052 0.167 0.095 1  0.758 1.053 0.758 1.462 
2 Intercept -5.274 1.068 24.372 1  0.000    
 LOGMV 0.348 0.187 3.456 1 * 0.063 1.417 0.981 2.046 
 MTB -0.161 0.118 1.873 1  0.171 0.851 0.676 1.072 
 CS 0.007 0.033 0.04 1  0.842 1.007 0.943 1.074 
 COP -0.001 0.017 0.06 1  0.936 0.999 0.966 1.032 
 STA 0.01 0.259 0.024 1  0.876 1.041 0.627 1.729 
 ROA 1.245 2.371 0.276 1  0.599 3.474 0.033 362.02 
 CTS -0.002 0.016 0.02 1  0.887 0.998 0.968 1.029 
 DTE -0.006 0.102 0.004 1  0.953 0.994 0.814 1.214 
 REG 0.223 0.325 0.471 1  0.493 1.25 0.661 2.366 
Page | 52  
 
 
Appendix 2 
 
 
 
 
Country R/NC/N Country R/NC/N 
Austria N Lithuania NC 
Belgium R Luxembourg N 
Bulgaria NC Malta NC 
Cyprus NC Netherlands N 
Czech Republic N Poland N 
Denmark  N Portugal R 
Estonia N Romania N 
Finland N Slovakia N 
France R Slovenia N 
Germany N Spain R 
Greece R Sweden N 
Hungary N UK N 
Ireland R Norway N 
Italy R Switzerland N 
Latvia NC   
N: Non-regulated ; R : Regulated ; NC: No Companies in the Sample 
Source: Haar and Jones (2008) and European Commission Benchmarking Reports (2007) 
Table 12: Regulated and non-regulated European energy markets  
 
